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Reappraisals of Critical Theory:
The Legacy of the Frankfurt
School in America
The participants in any discussion about Critical Theory in the United States have to keep in mind that Critical Theory is not identical with the Frankfurt School, at least not with the work of Horkheimer and Adorno or their disciples in postwar Ger many. In this country, Critical Theory, particularly during the I950S and early I960s, was primarily associated with Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, and Leo Lowenthal, originally mem bers of the Institute for Social Research, who decided to stay in America after World War 11. Clearly, the American New Left was informed and shaped by the work of Herbert Marcuse, rather than that of Adorno or Walter Benjamin. Of course, it is also true that Marcuse's Eros and Civilization and One Dimensional Man prepared the way for the reception of Ador no's and Benjamin's more complex and demanding oeuvres during the I970s. As Martin Jay has shown, the reception and integration of Adorno's work was a slow and uneven process, which, with good reasons, can be called incomplete even to day.I Much of Adorno's and Benjamin's writings are not yet available in English and are still waiting to be discovered by American critics. Still, it would be misleading to argue that 1. Martin Tay, "Adorno and America, " in his Permanent Exiles: Essays on the In tellectual Migration from Germany to America (New York, 1986), 120-37· the theory of the Frankfurt School is not known in the English speaking world. English editions, especially of Jürgen Haber mas's writings, and numerous critical studies attest to its visibility. In fact, during the last decade, the presence of the "German" brand of the Frankfurt School has to some extent eclipsed the "American"contribution of Marcuse and Lowen thal, because the work of Adorno, Benjamin, and Habermas participates more openly in present theoretical discourse. This presence today clearly transcends the leve! of primarily his torical interest, which had guided Martin Jay's first attempt to map the ideas and concepts of the Frankfurt School in Dialec tical Imagination (1973) and Susan Buck-Morss's intricate anal ysis of the early Adorno in her book Th e Origin 01 Negative Dialectics (1977) . 2 Today, we have to assess the presence of Critical Theory in different ways. We have to appraise its function within the contemporary configuration, which has radically changed since the initial reception of the Frankfurt School during the late 1960s. At that time, the work of Adorno, Benjamin, and the early Habermas was integrated into the American discussion as a way of reinforcing the project of Westem Marxism. The oppositional and critical force of these writers was directed against the formalist preferences of the New Critics and liberal social theory, for instance, the theories of Talcott Parsons and his students. The emphasis was clearly placed on the aspect of radical intervention to be carried out by marginal social groups. In Marxism and Form (1971), Fredric Jameson articulated this concem by bringing together the voices of Adorno and Benja min with those of Lukács and Sartre. Jameson's attempt at a synthesis underscored the refunctioning of Critical Theory in the American contexto While the Frankfurt School in Germany was quite unwilling to join with Lukács, in the United States, Critical Theory was brought in as a supplement to more tra ditional Marxist theory. This supplemental role-in the case of Jameson ultimately predicated on a Lukácsian model-had two strategic functions: first, Critical Theory was expected to provide Marxist literary criticism with a more refined model in which the mediation between social and aesthetic forces would be worked out in a more satisfactory manner¡ second, the influx of Critica! Theory was expected to counter the grow ing influence of structuralist Althusserian Marxism, whose most visible proponent became Terry Eagleton.
It would suffice to glance at the reviewer section of Te10s, on the one hand, and that of New Left Review, on the other, to get an impression of the ongoing struggle within the leftist campo The relentless polemic of Te10s 's contributors against the new "orthodoxy" under the disguise of French structural ism relied implicitly and occasionally explicitly on the rhetoric of the Frankfurt School against orthodox Marxism. For the Te los circle, Marx could be rescued from the dead weight of the Third Intemational only through the rigorous emphasis on the critical and subversive moment in his works. In this context, Critical Theory served as a weapon to undermine the structure of reified dogma. Yet even the Frankfurt School was not critical enough¡ the writings of its members too had to be purged of hidden orthodox elements. In his introduction to the Essentia1 Frankfurt Schoo1 Reader (1978) , Paul Piccone outlined what he considered the essential aspects of the Frankfurt School. More important, Piccone underscored the need for a critique of Crit ical Theory in its own spirit. He argued: "Contrary to Left conventional wisdom, according to which the quandaries of critical theory are the result of its having jettisoned funda mental Marxist assumptions, the real problem was the exact opposite: the unwarranted retention of too much traditional Marxist baggage.1I3 This indictment, apart from the question 3. Paul Piccone, "General Introduction, " in Th e Essential Frankfurt of its historical truth, reflects a very specific moment in the history of the New Left, namely the realization that its project had failed. The struggle for political and social emancipation was now perceived as a myth that had to be exploded-with the help of Critical Theory, especially Adomo's micrological criticismo At this juncture, Piccone resolutely rejected Mar cuse's attempts at theorizing on a macrological level, which he saw as confirming, at least implicitly, the Lukácsian project of History and Class Consciousness. From this vantage point, the failure of Critical Theory has to do with the central flaw of Dialectic oi Enlightenmen t, its inability to articulate the dialectic of advanced capitalist societies in specific historical terms. As a result of this inability, "the dialectic becomes de historicized to cover the whole of Westem civilization as the genesis of the domination of the concepto Consequently, crit ical theory does not even attempt to prefigure the future by elaborating the mediations necessary to bring it about, and becomes purely defensive: it ultimately retreats to defend par ticularity, autonomy and nonidentity against an allegedly to tally administered society where thinking itself appears as a dispensable luxury."4 Piccone's critique focuses precisely on those moments that would resurface in the debate of the 1980s: subjectivity, au tonomy, and nonidentity. What Piccone holds against Adorno is the unchallenged presence of a concept of totality that would necessarily marginalize nonidentity. In the totally planned so ciety, resistance is antiquated from the beginning. Piccone's attempt to recupera te Critical Theory emphasizes oppositional impetus at the expense of contento For Piccone, the future of Critical Theory lies in its radically undogmatic rethinking of advanced capitalist societies, especially their political and cul- In this respect, Richard Rorty's contribution stands out, since it makes an explicit attempt to bring Habermas into the orbit of French theory and the postmodernism debate. Rorty sum marizes the controversy between Habermas and Lyotard in the following way: "So we find French critics of Habermas ready to abandon liberal politics in order to avoid universalistic phi losophy, and Habermas trying to hang on to universalistic phi losophy, with all its problems, in order to support liberal politics./9 Habermas's reluctance to give up metanarrative as a form of legitimation, Rorty feels, is related to his aversion to a form of social and political criticism that is "context dependent" (instead of generalizable). Vis-a-vis these two pos itives, he argues-and more recently McCarthy has presented 8. Richard Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity, /J and An thony Giddens, "Reason without Revolution? Habermas's Th eorie des kommunikativen Handelns," in Habermas and Modernity, ed. Richard J. Bernstein (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), 161-76, 95-124.
9. Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard, " 162.
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similar arguments-that there is no need for a metanarrative, that the legitimation crisis of the modern age resulted from Kant's interpretation, especially his move to split "high culture up into science, morality, and art.IIIO Rorty strongly opposes this interpretation, sin ce it valorizes a metanarrative of mo dernity that is too narrow (German) and too pessimistic. What is more important, however, than Rorty's cultural evaluation of Habermas's tradition is his insight that French poststruc turalism-for instance, Foucault's theory-shares some of Ha bermas's problems insofar as it buys into the Kantian definition of modernity and therefore also into the Habermasian agenda (although of course not into his solutions). Hence his critique addresses both Lyotard (and Foucault) and Habermas, insisting on a new canon without subject philosophy and metanarrative but with a strong commitment to liberal (Habermasian) politics.
In terms of its historical significance, Rorty's essay helped to clarify not only Habermas's position vis-a-vis the continen tal philosophical tradition but also to map the fundamental conflict of the postmodernism debate that was initiated by Habermas's 1980 essay "Modernity versus Postmodernity" and later fueled by his Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1987). Since Habermas includes Horkheimer and Adorno in his fun damental critique, this debate has had an impact on the recent reception of Adorno as well. It was not entirely accidental that Rorty suggested a return to Adorno and Horkheimer as one way of getting away from metanarratives. On the other hand, it would be difficult to see Adorno outside the continental philosophical tradition that Rorty wants to cancel. For that reason, a philosophical alliance between Adorno and Rorty's pragmatism is unlikely-except for isolated points, such as the avoidance of dogmatic metanarratives and the need for mi- crological criticismo Much of recent Adorno criticism has used similar issues in order to recover aspects of Critical Theory that were lost or repressed in Habermasian consensus theory.
Of significant import in this context is Joel Whitebook's at tempt to reconstruct the contribution of Freud and psycho analysis to Critical Theory. II While the primary interest of his essay is the reworking of psychological aspects of Critical The ory in Habermas's work, Whitebook resists the tendency of much recent Habermas criticism simply to discard the older Frankfurt School as "superseded" by Habermasian theory. To be sure, Whitebook's reconstruction of the Freudian compo nents of Critical Theory is anything but uncritical. It points, among other things, to the limitations of id theory, as it was favored by Adorno and Marcuse, and to the somewhat pes si mistic tone of id psychology. Whitebook specifically relates the "pessimism" of Dialectic 01 Enlightenmen t to the authors' inability to come to terms with and integrate ego psychology. Yet, at the same time, he underscores the importance of the original agenda of the Frankfurt School by pointing out that Habermas, in his attempt to overcome the theoretical impasse of the early Critical Theory, also tends to shortchange the in itial project.
Whitebook criticizes the Habermasian project for its neglect of the central concem of Adorno and Benjamin with happiness, a concem not grounded in abstract norms but linked to the concept of mimesis. As a consequence of its "linguistic turn, " Habermasian theory of communicative action loses the sense of an "inner foreign territory, " which defines Freudian theory and also its appropriation by Marcuse and Adorno. Hence for Habermas the category of alienation becomes les s central and the problem of happiness a secondary one. His systematic dis tinction between happiness and social justice allows him to 1 I. Toel Whitebook, "Reason and Happiness: Sorne Psychoanalytic Thernes in Critical Theory, " in Bernstein, Habermas and Modernity, 140-60.
2°7
place in the foreground a notion of progress in the realm of morality, possibly at the expense of happiness. We should note that Whitebook acknowledges the theoretical advances of Ha bermasian theory over the older Frankfurt School, but he also wants to discuss the price for this gain. His critique boils down to the question of external reality and, more specin.cally, the question of the body. Thus he concludes: "we cannot defend the project of modemity-which must be defended-at the price of sacrin. cing the naturalistic tradition that runs from Feuerbach throughout the young Marx and Freud to the early Frankfurt SchooL'/12
Much of the recent discussion of Critical Theory has focused on the question Whitebook brings up in his assessment of Ha bermas's theory: Can one assume (with Bemstein, McCarthy, and others) that the theory of communicative action canceled older Critical Theory, or is there a need for a retum to Adorno and Benjamin? To sorne extent, this question itself reflects the limited reception of post-Adomian Critical Theory in this country, for within the context of the German discussion it would not be plausible to perceive Habermas as the only heir to the Frankfurt SchooL Under these circumstances, resistance toward Habermasian theory can easily take the form of a "re tum" to older models, just as the dissatisfaction of the second generation of the Frankfurt School in West Germany articu lated itself as a "retum" to the Marxist origins of the Frankfurt School in the I930s. This strategy of going back to the roots is sometimes linked to another move: the suggestion that the essence of Critical Theory is closely related to theoretical po sitions such as deconstruction or New Historicism. In this case, Adorno and Benjamin can be played out as potential allies against the Habermasian version of Critical Theory, or, on the other hand, Adorno can be framed-as in Bemstein's account as a crypto-Heideggerian.
It may be appropriate at this point to examine the stakes of Here it is deconstruction that serves as the negative force for the reevaluation. In both cases, the reappraisal of Critical The ory also involves reconfigurations in the understanding of op positions and alliances. The political agenda, however, is rarely spelled out¡ typically, it is couched in epistemological and methodological terms. Unlike the 1960s and early 1970S, when theoretical issues were frequently reduced to political ones, during the 1980s we find a tendency to discuss political con flicts under the disguise of theoretical models. For this reason the contemporary contribution of Critical Theory is best as sessed in the context of specific themes and issues. My own discussion will focus on three areas, namely, con ceptions of culture, the postmodernism debate, and the theo retical articulation of feminismo Obviously, these thematic concerns are interrelated, though they operate on different lev els: among them, it is primarily the theory of culture that serves as a metalevel for the discussion of the other two, feminism and postmodernism. In its more differentiated conception of culture, Critical Theory is said to have made major gains in comparison with traditional Marxism. In different ways, Ben jamin, Adorno, and Marcuse criticized reductive base/super structure models. For Habermas, a return to a traditional model was never in question¡ at the same time, however, from his early work on, his conceptualization of culture differs signin. cantly from Adorno's attempts. These differences have left their traces in the American debate of the 1980s-not only in the encounter between Critical Theory and poststructuralist approaches but also in the less pronounced dialogue with Cul tural Marxism and the New Historicism.
In certain ways both Marcuse's and Adorno's den.nitions of culture stayed very close to a rather narrow traditional con ception of high culture (Kultur). Their work can positively in voke "culture" as the canonical tradition in literature or music. When Adorno practiced his method of close reading, the typical focus remained masterpieces of the high-culture tradition, for instance, Beethoven's late sonatas or Goethe's Ip higenie. Need less to say, this exclusive den.nition of culture, with its close proximity to a conservative understanding of culture as an au tonomous aesthetic realm, has not attracted much attention lately. More important are two aspects of Adorno's theory that have informed the discourse of the New Left and more recently seem to resurface in the work of the New Historians. First, the autonomy of culture is not absolute but mediated through so cial conventions and institutions. Such a conviction rejects as ideology the abstract concept of culture and considers the cul tural criticism based on such an abstract notion dogmatic and uncritical. Second, the relationship between high culture and mass culture must not be understood as an opposition but rather as a dialectical relationship that has to be examined as part of the social formation. It was precisely this aspect of Adorno's theory of mas s culture that was not fully understood in the American mass-culture debate of the 1940S and 1950S, since this debate treated the opposition as an abstract dichot omy. The Frankfurt School's critique of mass culture not only undermined this dichotomy but, in doing so, also broadened the concept of culture, bringing into prominence aspects that traditional criticism had constant1y exc1uded from critical scru tiny. The recent canon debate is c1ear1y indebted to Critical Theory, although the connection is rarely explicit, since the immediate impetus for the discussion frequent1y comes from studies of ethnic subcultures and women's studies.
Obviously, it would be misleading to describe the critical discourse of the 1980s as a straight continuation or even mod ified extension of the Frankfurt School-or of Westem Marx ism, for that matter. What current critical approaches have retained, however, is a sense of the intrinsic relation between cultural interpretation and social theory. In fact, in the present debate, the c1assical distinction between them, which still in formed the work of the older Frankfurt School, has vanished. Cultural theory has subsumed social theory, primarily under the rubric of cultural practices. Conversely, forms of domina tion and coercive practices are no longer exc1usively or pri marily located at the level of the social system. The concept of affirmative culture, introduced by Herbert Marcuse in 1937, captures part of this shift but not aH of it. His own work, as well as that of Adorno, remained linked to the category of the autonomous art work as the bearer of oppositional and utopian forces and thus could not embrace a broad anthropological con cept of culture. For Marcuse and Adorno the "core" of culture, the advanced art work, escapes cultural hegemony through its own formal structure, which articulates the opposition against the social relations in which it is embedded.
For the ongoing critical debate in the United States, the dif ferentiated concept of culture of the Frankfurt School has been fruitful, yet by no means binding. Classical Critical Theory becomes one of a number of voices¡ frequent1y it is used-for instance, in John Brenkman's Culture and Domination (1987)-as a critical force for the discussion of thematic prob lems. For Brenkman, a critical definition of culture has to hark back to the writings of Marx and Engels. In this historical unfolding of the cultural problematic, the contribution of the Frankfurt School hecomes a significant moment (hut no more than that) in the history of Western Marxism. Moreover, on a critical note, Brenkman suggests that Western Marxism (and the Frankfurt School) remains bound to the tradition of sci entific Marxism, that is, to "the reduction of culture to con sciousness and of social relations to relations of production./I14 As a result, culture becomes eclipsed and depoliticized.
While this assessment is useful in the case of Adorno, it certainly misses the core of Benjamin's later writings, which are precisely concerned with the political moment in culture. Brenkman, however, is certainly justified in underscoring the need for a political definition of culture. Of course, in this statement not only is the concept of culture at stake, but so also is the concept of the political. The typical dismissal of Adorno's philosophy of art during the 1970S as quietistic was predicated on a notion of poli tic s as radical opposition rather than self-reflexive subversion. In more recent definitions of the political, the micrological aspect of culture and the literary text-favored in Adorno's approach-plays a more important role. It is not accidental, therefore, that Brenkman in his reading of Blake's poetry comes hack to the notion of internal contra dictions and language practice. Where he turns away from Adorno is the latter's understanding of the art work as an au tonomous constructo Instead, he wants to focus on the double movement of a reading that responds to overdetermined and multivalent poetic language. By invoking Freudian interpre tation, he wants to stress the suspended or floating attention of Blake's reader. But this strategy of reading and situating the literary text is much closer to Adorno than Brenkman seems to realize. Where he does indeed transcend the Adornian scope of criticism is in his notion that interpretation, even in its ideal form, always contains a moment of resistance, that the ideal reader is always engaged in social practices that codetermine the act of reading.
14. John Brenkman, Culture and Domination (Ithaca, 1985) , 100.
What emerges in Brenkman's discussion is a fundamental dissatisfaction with the social theory of the older Frankfurt School. Indeed, for Brenkman the most apparent weakness of Adomo's later theory stems from the fact that he and Hork heimer failed to develop a more flexible model of capitalist societies after 1944. While Adorno considerably refined his aes thetic theory and criticism during the 1950S and 1960s, his concept of the advanced capitalist society as a totally admin istered society froze and did not take in later developments. The moment of reification becomes the final word for all social practices. Therefore, the subjective moment, unable to express itself socially, moves into the art work. This, however, means that the true locus of Adomo's late social theory is his aesthetic theory. The definition of the art work as a monad contains more than Adomo's explicit formulations of the relationship between society and art¡ it is the core of Adomo's theory, namely, the complete entwinement of the social and the aes thetic. To this we have to add the political aspecto The work of art is the site of political resistance. Still, Brenkman's cri tique addresses an important point. In Adomo's later theory the social agent is underprivileged¡ or, to put it differently, the social structure dominates the individual and his or her social practice. By harking back to Raymond Williams and British Cultural Marxism, Brenkman means to insert a different un derstanding of cultural practice, which undercuts the societyl art dichotomy. The political significance of this strategy de serves attention. Its intent is to mobilize the interaction be tween poetry and society as an interaction between two discursive practices in such a way that the outcome is not already predetermined. In order to reestablish the political thrust of the Marxist tradition, Brenkman abandons Adomo's social theory as well as the premises of his micrological anal ysis, tuming to a psychoanalytical approach instead.
If the political aspect of culture is at the center of the recent debate (and the case for this emphasis can be made), the legacy of Critical Theory comes into play in various and contradictory forms. Different strands and phases can and have been played out against each other. Clearly, the concept of the polítical in Benjamin's criticism figures differently from that in Haber mas's theory, for instance. But in spite of considerable differ ences of emphasis and outspoken disagreement about the Iegacy of CriticaI Theory, one is struck by a common element in more recent essays and books. Whereas the tenor of the discussion in the 1970S stressed the distance toward the oIder Frankfurt School for political reasons, the critical discussion of the 1980s has recuperated the political force of Critical The ory, especially in the writings of Benjamin, but also, more sur prisingly, in the work of Adorno. For example, in Modern Culture and Critical Th eory (1989), Russell A. Berman argues that Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic 01 Enligh tenment con tains a political message that speaks to the contemporary sit uation, though mediated through a historical analysis of the mid-1940S. The radical move, Berman suggests, consists of ed ucating the individual for autonomy. "For critical theory, au tonomy is the project of the subj ect who has not yet escaped heteronomous determination but who might do so, a potential indicative of the openness of history not closed off by the ide alism of an epistemic logic of genealogy.l/I S We should note that the target of this polemical formulation is no longer a conservative defense of freedom or an orthodox Marxist con ception of class struggle but Foucault's concept of genealogy with its stress on power. What Berman wants to bring into the foreground are the different political implications of two po sitions that seemingly concur in their critique of the Enlight enment. The point of this comparison is that Critical Theory, unlike Foucauldian genealogy, is not satisfied with a pessi mistic account of structures of domination. Instead, it marks the moment of freedom in the resistance of the victim. This reading of Adorno stands in clear although unacknowledged opposition to that of Habermas in the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, notwithstanding that it shares the turn against genealogy. Clearly, the attempt to revitalize Adorno, particu larly in the area of cultural criticism, has created a division in the appropriation of Critical Theory. This strain becomes more visible in the postmodernism debate-a debate that has been labeled as an exchange between IIGerman" and "French" the ory, represented by Habermas and Foucault. This is not the place to review the entire debate.16 My ob servations will focus on the role of Critical Theory as a force in the definition of postmodernism. In this context, it is im portant to remind ourselves that Critical Theory is not iden tical with Habermasian theory. This is especially true in regard to the analysis and evaluation of modernity. The voices of the Frankfurt School have to be carefully distinguished. The in tervention of Jürgen Habermas in 1980, which has made for a great deal of agitation in various camps, must also be under stood as part of an ongoing debate within the Frankfurt School a9<>ut the Enlightenment and its implications. It was prefigured alreaay in the controversy between Benjamin and Adorno about the loss of aura and the function of mas s culture and the new media (film).
For a number of reasons it is not entirely surprising that the response to Habermas's project has been ambiguous and strained among American critics, who are fundamentally sym pathetic to Critical Theory. Moreover, from the vantage point of the American discourse on postmodernism, the contribution of Habermas came at a rather late stage of the debate. As An dreas Huyssen points out in his essay "Mapping the Postmod ern/' the debate about the end of modernism emerged in the In his by now notorious essay "Modemity-an Incomplete Project, " Habermas boldly subsumed the aesthetic debate un der the historical debate about the post-Enlightenment age.
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In doing so, he implicitly invoked the entire trajectory of West em Marxism from the early Lukács to the late Adorno, since in all its stages Westem Marxism had to respond to the central problem: how do we understand and evaluate the transition that occurred during the eighteenth century? Clearly, through the amalgamation of modemism and modemity on the one hand, and of postmodemism and postmodemity on the other, the stakes became much higher-as did also the ensuing con fusiono While Peter Bürger's Th eory of th e Avant-Garde (1974) conceptualized the problem of the end of the (classical) avant garde in terms of a linear development from modemism to the avant-garde and its historical demise during the 19 30S, thereby historicizing both Adorno and Lukács, the expansion of the debate during the 1980s has undermined the very teleology on which Bürger's argument was predicated. 19 As a result, the his- the immediate context, the question whether Jameson's as sessment is plausible is not important¡ what matters is the clear connection of his position with the Frankfurt School. On another level, however, Jameson breaks away from a notion of autonomous art that Adorno never gave up. By defining the postmodernist style as pastiche, as a repetition without au thenticity, he undercuts the avant-garde/mass-culture oppo sition on which Adorno's theory was predicated. From Adorno's point of view, this would mean that the moment of resistance in culture, which for him was inevitably coupled with the advanced art work, had vanished. The consequence would be complete despair, since hope, as Adorno tells us at the end of Negative Dialectics (1966), is linked to the noncon ceptual particular, especially to the work of arto Interestingly enough, Adorno's "pessimism, " which over shadowed the German debate of the 1970s, has not had a major impact on the American postmodernism discussion of the 1980s. As Andreas Huyssen observed in 1981, the absence of a perceived downturn after the Second World War, as well as the absence of an indigenous American avant-garde (in the rad ical sense of the term), provided a dynamic to the postwar years that was missing in Europe. Thus he labels American art of the 1960s as the "colorful death mask of a classical avant garde."22 Yet the American endgame of the avant-garde, defin ing itself as postmodernism, is played out as rejection of high modernism and nostalgia for the historical avant-garde. While Huyssen, very much in the tradition of Critical Theory, points to the potentially affirmative character of postmodernism (for instance, its delight in pop culture), he carefully refrains from the Adornian tendency to view the end of the avant-garde as a complete closure of history. Rather, he concludes by under scoring the need for regaining a sense of history (beyond a notion of triviality) and a conception of cultural identity. At the same time, he do es not advocate a return to the classical 22. Huyssen, After the Great Divide, 168.
avant-garde, whose claims to cultural and social regeneration have lost their validity.
This evaluation of postmodernism takes issue with the Ador nian "pessimism" but also with Habermas's defense of mo dernity and (by implication) modernismo Huyssen's critique of Habermas, more suggested than strictly argued, stresses two points: the need for a more differentiated and dialectical ac count of the modern age than Habermas offers, and a strong suspicion against a theoretical project that relies on a totalizing view of history. These suggestions, clearly formulated against the background of poststructuralist theory, can be taken as an indication that the issue of postmodernism has encouraged a reorientation within the appropriation of Critical Theory. This reorientation often involves a more or less critical turn back to Adorno, as well as a (sometimes only implicit) distancing from the Habermasian "project of modernity." A good example of this complex move is the reading of Adorno in Russell Ber man's recent work, Modern Culture and Critical Th eory. Writ ing in a somewhat different context from Huyssen, Berman nevertheless provides (like Huyssen) a version of the Frankfurt School legacy that does not follow the Habermasian line in responding to postmodernism.
Berman develops his position by defending aesthetic auton omy (as Adorno's theory defined it) against Peter Bürger's critique. What Berman objects to in Bürger's theory of the avant-garde is Bürger's strong claim about the necessary linear development leading toward postautonomous arto Berman con siders that Bürger's model overemphasizes "the predominance of a single aesthetic model within an institutional phase."2.3 He argues that Bürger's central thesis about the failure of the avant-garde (and the consequent lapse into postautonomy) is based on the problema tic assumption that the avant-garde con stituted the hegemonic art form of the early twentieth century. Against this, Berman contends that the avant-garde was only one strand in the configuration of modemism, and that it has maintained its critical position apart from the historical logic of monopoly capitalismo Consequently, Berman can valorize the avant-garde and its critical function, thereby opposing both postautonomous decline and postmodemist indifferenceo This argument rescues Adomian aesthetic theory without burying itself in the mood of despair that tinges much of Adomo's later writingo
In no way do I want to imply that Huyssen's and Berman's approaches to the problematic of postmodemism are identical. In fact, they clearly disagreeo While Huyssen underlines the moment of subversion in postmodemist pluralism, Berman, more in the spirit of Adorno, tends to dismiss postmodemism as affirmative eclecticismo "The cultural theory of postmod emism provides the affirmative description of that which is merely giveno Although it may carefully sketch power struc tures and practical strategies, its rejection of emancipatory au tonomy precludes any systematic critical projectom4 What they do share, however-and this is the crucial point-is a sense of resistance to theoretical constructs of the kind that Habermas's later theory offerso Obviously, the issue of postmodernism has not only divided the American Left, it has also brought about different and con flicting receptions of Critical Theory, ranging from an ack nowledgment of postmodemist pluralism to a critique of its affirmative character based either on Adomo's idea of aesthetic truth or Habermas's notion of a los s of rational criticismo Sim ilarly, there are also different emphases in the explicit or im plicit political agenda connected with these positions-though these differences seem to be les s pronounced than the theo retical oneso During the 1980s, the appropriation of Critical Theory in the United Sta tes, through its contact with other theoretical traditions, has (successfully, I believe) resituated the Left within the American discourseo While the theoretical 240 Ibido, s lo 220 interface has not necessarily changed the epistemological models, it has clearly redefined the political position of the Left, in particular its understanding of the theory/practice re lation. What the question of postmodernism has helped to clar ify for Critical Theory in this country is the inadequacy of the revolutionary models of the 1960s and the need for a broader definition of cultural practice, a conception in which the cul tural and political are seen as complements rather than oppositions.
In even more dramatic ways than postmodernism, feminism has challenged received conceptions of culture and politics. In the case of West Germany (East Germany followed a different path altogether), it has led to a split between Critical Theory and feminist theory, since the cultural criticism of the Frank furt School did not address the concerns of women. As far as the United States is con cerned, the major strands of feminist theory that have dominated the discourse of the 1970S and 1980s-American feminism, represented by such critics as Su san Gubar, Sandra Gilbert, and Elaine Showalter, and French poststructuralist feminism (Hélene Cixous and Julia Kris teva)-followed different epistemological and methodological trajectories.25 Only more recently has Critical Theory beco me a distinct voice. In the feminist debate, however, the locus of Critical Theory appears to be rather different from that of the postmodernist debate. Its critical edge has turned, to a large extent, against the "French" poststructuralist version of fem inism. Hence its position is by and large closer to, but clearly not identical with, more traditional versions of Marxist theory emphasizing the historical nature of women's issues.26 In this somewhat ambivalent alliance, the work of Jürgen Habermas, frequently attacked in the cultural debate, has become a focal point for a number of important questions. In her essay "What's Critical about Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender" (1985) , Nancy Fraser squarely addresses the problem of conceptualizing gender differences in the theory of communicative action.27 The question of gender rarely surfaced in Adorno's work and was linked with the ques tion of revolutionary movements in Marcuse's late writings only in a very general way, but Fraser rightly insists that Ha bermasian theory, because of its universal claims, has to re spond to feminist issues on a number of levels, namely thematic, methodological, and epistemological. One obvious difficulty for a feminist appropriation is Habermas's silence on the specific social and cultural problems of women. One pos sible strategy to overcome this drawback would be to mobilize the distinction between labor and communication in Habermas for a critique of the bias in traditional Marxist theory toward male-dominated production, but one has to grant that, in terms of the structure of Habermasian theory, the male/female op position does not fit easily into the difference between labor and symbolic action. Thus, Fraser suggests a more "structural" approach to the question of women's work, grafted onto the distinction between system-integrated and socially integrated (symbolic) actions. Furthermore, Fraser refers to the Haber masian division between life-world and system (typical for modern societies) in order to mark the difference between the private and the public sphere. In short, Fraser takes over major parts of Habermas's social theory for her own project, yet with the proviso that they have to be reworked for the articulation of feminist concerns.
From the feminist point of view, the private/public distinc tion mirrors the distribution between "productive" work and family. By putting the category to an empirical test, Fraser tries to show that the Habermasian distinction misses the mark, that it especially does not adequately reflect the function of the family and the role of women in it. From a normative point of view, according to Fraser, the public/private distinction equally fails to address the imbalance of the traditional family structure. Specifically, Fraser notes a contradiction between the idea of social progress in Habermas's theory (which is ex pressed in terms of differentiation) and the norm of social justice. While social progress is linked to a process of differ entiation in which the modern family and, with it, women are limited to the private realm, the idea of social justice cannot, as Habermas would agree, tolerate gender difference. To sorne extent, this critique misses the tension within the Haberma sian concept of the public sphere, the tension between its fac tual and its normative aspect, by conflating these levels in Habermas's theory. What is more important, however, is the more general charge of gender blindness of the theoretical model that has defined Habermas's work since the mid-I97os. Fraser contends that his blindspot can be traced to the "cate gorical opposition between system and lifeworld institutions, " which contains a bias toward a male-oriented society.28 This critique simultaneously rescues other parts of Habermasian theory, however, among them the cultural interpretation of needs and the dialogical process of satisfying them.29 For Fraser, the reception of Critical Theory is conceived as a selective and critical appropriation in which feminist concerns define the boundaries of acceptance.
Fraser's pragmatic strategy, with its somewhat understated understanding of the common ground, addresses primarily so cial problems but does not take up the larger issue of cultural difference that has defined the direction of feminist literary criticismo In this context, the question of the public sphere would take on a somewhat different meaning. Using Haber-mas's Strukturwandel der Oeffen tlichkeit (Structural trans formation of the public sphere), Rita FeIski has argued that the women's movement has created an important counter-public sphere within a male-defined society.30 In her emphasis on the division within the public space and the possibility of under mining the hegemonic public discourse, Felski clearly extends Habermas's conception in a direction that moves her close to the position of Negt and Kluge.3 I The point FeIski wants to make is that a feminist public sphere opens up ne� 'spaces of resistance that could and should be occupied by a variety of approaches and theories. "Given the complex interpretations of state and society in late capitalism, one can no longer pos tulate the ideal of a public sphere which can function outside existing commercial and state institutions and at the same time claim an influential and representative function as a forum for oppositional activity and debate.'J32 By stressing the need for a discussion arena, she moves the reception of Habermas to the level of metatheory, a move that allows her to integrate Critical Theory in a more general way. Felski does not limit her dis cussion of feminist theory to specific doctrines of the Frankfurt School¡ rather, she underscores a critical perspective on the recent American conceptualization of women's studies. In par ticular, her approach raises the question of how feminist stud ies in the fieId of literature affect social and political structures. FeIski rightly calls attention to the situation of late capitalist countries where the differentiation of the cultural and the po- litical spheres does not encourage the immediate impact of one sphere on the other. Unlike Fraser, who is looking for a positive social model for the application of women's concems, Felski stress es the "Ador nian" aspect of Critical Theory, that is, its mode of critical reflection, as it engages theoretical positions. Again, it is the level of metatheory that becomes relevant for feminism, for instance, in a critique of feminist aesthetics both in American and French theory. Felski's metatheoretical method is espe cially telling in view of attempts to construct transhistorical modes of feminist writings. Within the American discourse, this project has frequently assumed a distinctive female sen sibility grounded in a gendered experience. Yet, as Felski ar gues, this project is open to serious criticism because it overlooks significant social and cultural differences. "There are, moreover, obvious problems with a theoretical position which enshrines existing ideologies of sexual difference through reference to the supposedly intuitive and emotional quality of female consciousness, thereby merely reaffirming rather than questioning the authority of existing gender ste reotypes."33 Coming from Critical Theory, Felski argues that the lack of a sophisticated theory of ideology has typically trapped American feminism in an undifferentiated male/fe male dichotomy. Whereas Felski's criticism of American feminism targets es pecially its reliance on ahistorical conceptions, her objections to French theory make a very different use of Critical Theory. Here she place s in the foreground the similarities with Ador no's aesthetic theory, pointing to the problems involved in a modemist aesthetics. This critique builds on the post-Adomian concept of the avant-garde (Hans Magnus Enzensberger, BürgerJ, which has radically deconstfll: cted the logical connec tion between the political and the aesthetic avant-garde. Like 33. Ibid., 27· this critique, an advanced feminist position also has to question assumptions about a necessary connection between "avant garde" fragmentary writing and political subversion. Making use of Mary Jacobus's critique of Hélene Cixous, Felski argues against any attempt to ground feminist criticism in the gen dered nature of language.34 For her this construct must fail because it dogmatically separates the feminine question fram the social question and thereby "reiterates and is easily assim ilated into a long-standing cultural symbolization of woman in Westem society.II3S If Elaine Marks's statement, "Reading becomes the subversive act par excellence, " is programmatic, the proximity to Adomo's aesthetic theory is indeed of crucial importance for a critical reading of écriture féminine (female writing or discourse).36 Clearly, in this respect Felski tends to si de with a Habermasian position that deflates the political claims of immanent criticism and, by extension, fragmentary, subversive writing. This critique emphasizes the need for con textualization: only the specific historico-social context allows the feminist critic to make political use of negativity. This leads to a method of reading that consistently deontologizes the feminist project, deconstructing the notion of an absolute distinction between the writing of males and females. The pol itics of writing and reading is not predetermined by fixed gender differences, rather, they have to be negotiated in the public sphere. Furthermore, the social and political function of a lit erary text has to be established within the context of the actual apprapriation, that is to say, its subversive moment do es not mechanically translate into political opposition.
Given the centrality of the concept of the public sphere for Felski's argument, it is not surprising that she tums to Haber mas's Strukturwandel. We have to note, however, that her appropriation of Habermas's work, like that of Nancy Fraser, is selective. She clearly does not subscribe to the entire project of the early Habermas, which was not particularly sensitive to women's issues. Instead, she integrates those aspects of the Habermasian theory of the public sphere that help her to ar ticulate the resistance of patriarchal societies to the needs of women. It is in this context that she examines the claims of feminist aesthetics and argues that there "remains, then, both an interaction and an inevitable tension between the spheres of 'feminism' and 'aesthetics.'
1137 It is a tension that cannot be resolved in either direction. The critical edge of literary analysis has to question the autonomy of the literary text as much as the social and political ideologies that determine the institu tion of literature. Again, this claim is rather close to Critical Theory in its general approach, even where Felski disagrees with specific theorists. When Eugene Lunn examined the interface between Marx ism and modernism in Marxism and Modernism (I982), he could still safely assume that the project of Western Marxism was more or les s intacto Hence his own analysis traced the trajectory of German Marxism from Lukács to Adorno and Benjamin as part of the larger project of Western Marxism. In his conclusion, he (cautiously) affirmed Adorno's position on the avant-garde and mass culture while, at the same time, leav ing sorne space for a Brechtian or Benjaminian position. Such an affirmation is, I feel, no longer possible. During the last decade, the meaning of the four theorists whom Lunn examined (Lukács, Brecht, Benjamin, Adorno) has changed in a major way. This does not mean that their work can be discarded. The question is its appropriation. It seems that the construct "West ern Marxism" has lost sorne of its usefulness for the present debate. For one thing, Critical Theory, even in its traditional definition, does not easily fit this term anymore. Jürgen Ha bermas cannot be called a Western Marxist. Furthermore, Crit-37· Ibid., 179· ical Theory has opened up and moved in various directions by interfacing with different theoretical traditions. As a result, the conception of critical theory itself has altered. Boundaries that used to be stable have collapsed and new borderlines have emerged. This revisionism has been most visibly carried out by the New Historicists-theoretically speaking, a blend ofthe neo-Marxists (Frankfurt School), poststructuralists (Foucault), and cultural anthropologists (Clifford Geertz)-but it also ap pears, as 1 have tried to show, in the postmodemism debate. There is an obvious danger in this eclectic blending-the loss of the oppositional force, the "mainstreaming" of Critical The ory. The New Historicists have not always avoided this danger. But, on the other hand, there are considerable gains. To refuse the opening, to insist on the traditional boundaries, means to get caught in the past and to close off the future. The survival of Critical Theory depends on a self-critical reappraisal of its own tradition and of its locus within different cultural and political configurations. This ongoing process implies a differ ent attitude toward its past, namely a nonlinear view of its own development and an acknowledgment of complex theo retical constellations. Of course, the early Frankfurt School, especially Horkheimer, was striving toward an interdiscipli nary project in which the Marxist model was expected to be hegemonic. Forty years later and under very different circum stances, Jürgen Habermas made another attempt using a lin guistic model. Both projects failed in their desire to favor a particular model. It seems that during the 1980s Critical The ory has been most effective as a local theory in a dialogical situation with different approaches and methods, receiving its strength from concrete social conflicts and struggles.
